Hacks
Rari Capital, 1 May 2022
Data as of 22 November 2026
DefiLlama's record lists Rari Capital on 1 May 2022, with $80.0M lost across 2 chains, classed as Reentrancy, technique Reentrancy. By amount it is the 52nd largest of 1,373 incidents in the record, and the 11th largest of 2022. The account below is ours, written from the sources it links; the figures are DefiLlama's, as of 22 November 2026, and the record does not say whether they are before or after any recovery.
- Amount recorded$80.0M
- Date1 May 2022
- ClassReentrancy
- TechniqueReentrancy
What happened
Fuse was Rari Capital’s platform of permissionless lending pools, in which anyone with a wallet could lend or borrow ERC-20 tokens, CertiK explains. Rari had merged with Fei Protocol in December 2021, CoinDesk reported. DefiLlama’s record dates the incident 1 May 2022. The Fuse post-mortem by Jack Longarzo, a member of Rari and Tribe DAO according to Decrypt, puts the exploit at about 2:20 a.m. Pacific time (09:20 UTC) on Saturday 30 April 2022, when seven Fuse pools (8, 18, 27, 127, 144, 146 and 156) were drained in quick succession. About $80 million was taken. When alerted, the team paused borrowing on every pool, which it says kept the attack from reaching others.
How it worked
Fuse pools ran on a fork of Compound’s lending code, CertiK says. In the
borrow() function, the ether was sent to the borrower before the loan was
written to the borrower’s account. The transfer used .call.value()(), which
hands the recipient unlimited gas and lets it run its own code, the post-mortem
explains. From inside that call the attacker invoked exitMarket() on the
pool’s comptroller. Most of the Fuse codebase sat behind a reentrancy lock, but
that function did not, so the attacker could withdraw collateral before the new
debt was recorded. CertiK notes that a security upgrade Rari reported on 1 April
2022 had blocked reentrancy on other functions but left exitMarket() open. In
the one exploited pool on Arbitrum, where ether could not be borrowed, the
attack re-entered during ether redemption instead.
The attacker used three accounts per pool, the post-mortem says. Account 1 supplied flash-loaned ether, and accounts 2 and 3 supplied flash-loaned stablecoins. Through the reentrancy, accounts 2 and 3 borrowed all the pool’s ether, including the flash-loaned ether, and got their collateral back. That let the attacker repay the flash loans. Account 1 was still credited with ether that was no longer there, and it borrowed most of the remaining stablecoins.
Afterwards
Fei Protocol offered to let the attacker keep $10 million as a bounty if the
rest of the funds were returned, CoinDesk
reported.
The fix, the post-mortem says, replaced the uncapped call with .transfer(),
which allows only 2,300 gas, and updated the borrower’s balance before sending
funds.
Repaying victims took four votes, Decrypt reported. Tribe DAO, the organisation formed when Rari and Fei merged, voted in May to repay them from its treasury. A second vote about a month later vetoed that decision, and a third, a week after the veto, rejected repayment. On 15 June Fei Labs said it could not at that time back any reimbursement plan that used the assets backing the FEI stablecoin, citing Rari’s terms of service. It also said Fuse was operated separately from Fei Protocol. In September 2022, as Tribe DAO was dissolving, a fourth vote, held on-chain, passed with 99 per cent support to repay the full amount stolen. Individuals were to be paid in FEI and DAOs in DAI.
Account reviewed 22 November 2026. The facts in it come from the sources linked in the text; the figures above are DefiLlama's record, which places it on Ethereum, Arbitrum and files the target as DeFi Protocol.
In DefiLlama's record
| Date | Incident | Class | Technique | Chains | Amount |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022-05-01 | Rari Capital | Reentrancy | Reentrancy | Ethereum, Arbitrum | $80.0M |
More from the record: every incident in 2022, Reentrancy, Reentrancy, and the whole record.
Other large incidents in 2022
| Date | Incident | Class | Technique | Chains | Amount |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022-03-23 | Ronin Bridge | Key Compromise | Validator Key Compromised | Ethereum | $624.0M |
| 2022-10-06 | Binance Bridge | Bridge & Cross-Chain | Proof Verifier Bug | BSC | $570.0M |
| 2022-11-12 | FTX | Social Engineering | Phishing | Ethereum, Solana | $450.0M |
| 2022-02-02 | Portal | Input Validation | Signature Verification Flaw | Solana | $326.0M |
| 2022-08-01 | Nomad | Bridge & Cross-Chain | Forged Proof | Ethereum | $190.0M |
| 2022-04-17 | Beanstalk | Governance | Flashloan Governance Attack | Ethereum | $181.0M |
| 2022-09-20 | Wintermute | Social Engineering | Phishing | Ethereum | $160.0M |
| 2022-10-11 | Mango Markets V3 | Oracle Manipulation | Spot Price Manipulation | Solana | $115.0M |
| 2022-06-05 | Elrond | Token & Share Accounting | Infinite Mint | MultiversX | $113.0M |
| 2022-06-23 | Harmony Bridge | Key Compromise | Validator Key Compromised | Ethereum, BSC | $100.0M |
| 2022-01-28 | Qubit | Input Validation | Missing Input Validation | BSC | $80.0M |
| 2022-03-23 | Cashio | Input Validation | Missing Input Validation | Solana | $52.8M |
Source: DefiLlama, retrieved 22 November 2026, under its open methodology. Figures are a dated snapshot, not a live feed.