Hacks
Elrond, 5 June 2022
Data as of 22 November 2026
DefiLlama's record lists Elrond on 5 June 2022, with $113.0M lost on MultiversX, classed as Token & Share Accounting, technique Infinite Mint. By amount it is the 40th largest of 1,373 incidents in the record, and the 9th largest of 2022. The account below is ours, written from the sources it links; the figures are DefiLlama's, as of 22 November 2026, and the record does not say whether they are before or after any recovery.
- Amount recorded$113.0M
- Date5 June 2022
- ClassToken & Share Accounting
- TechniqueInfinite Mint
What happened
Late on Sunday 5 June 2022, large EGLD transfers and big swaps on the Maiar Exchange began appearing on the Elrond mainnet, Elrond’s incident report says. From about 1 a.m. Eastern European Summer Time that night, an attacker drained 1.65 million EGLD from the three contracts that swap EGLD for its wrapped form, WEGLD: 400,000 on shard 0, 800,000 on shard 1 and 450,000 on shard 2. The attacker wrapped part of the haul, sold it on Maiar for USDC and UTK, and pushed the EGLD price in the USDC pool down to about $4. About 4 million USDC and 1 million UTK were bridged to Ethereum before the bridge was halted, and a further 1.4 million USDC was frozen in the bridge.
How it worked
DefiLlama files the technique as an infinite mint; Elrond’s report describes a
flaw in its virtual machine, not in the swap contracts or the exchange, and says
no EGLD was minted. It likens only the resulting surplus of WEGLD to an unbacked
mint. A newly deployed VM function, executeOnDestContextByCaller, let one
contract call another as if the original caller had sent the transaction.
Community developers found that it could move funds in a caller’s name, and the
team scheduled a patch barring value transfers through it. That weekend they
found something worse. Called from inside an asynchronous callback, the function
let a malicious contract act in the name of any contract it called. It could
therefore drain EGLD from any contract in its own shard. According to the
report, these findings were discussed openly in a public developer channel.
Staked EGLD, which sits on the metachain, and ESDT tokens were out of reach. The
swap contracts were not, and their EGLD backed every WEGLD in circulation. The
attack came less than 36 hours before the scheduled patch was due.
Afterwards
The team paused the exchange, the wrapping contracts and the bridge, and froze USDC and UTK transfers. Validators began applying an emergency VM patch at around 7:20 a.m. EEST, and a second patch that evening removed the function entirely. By Tuesday most funds had been recovered; the report withheld details, citing an open investigation. The team bought back WEGLD at the attacker’s sale prices and burned 728,000 of it, then paid 922,000 EGLD back into the swap contracts, 200,000 of it from the Elrond Foundation’s reserve. Maiar reopened on 8 June.
In July 2024 prosecutors from DIICOT, Romania’s organised crime and terrorism directorate, placed three unnamed defendants under judicial control, Radio Free Europe reported. The prosecutors accused them of illegally transferring 1.65 million units of a cryptocurrency, which they valued at about $120.8 million. They said the injured party had recovered more than 95 per cent, leaving a loss of about $9.3 million. MultiversX, as Elrond is now called, told StartupCafe.ro that the case concerned its June 2022 incident and that no user had lost money.
Account reviewed 22 November 2026. The facts in it come from the sources linked in the text; the figures above are DefiLlama's record, which places it on MultiversX and files the target as DeFi Protocol.
In DefiLlama's record
| Date | Incident | Class | Technique | Chains | Amount |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022-06-05 | Elrond | Token & Share Accounting | Infinite Mint | MultiversX | $113.0M |
More from the record: every incident in 2022, Token & Share Accounting, Infinite Mint, and the whole record.
Other large incidents in 2022
| Date | Incident | Class | Technique | Chains | Amount |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022-03-23 | Ronin Bridge | Key Compromise | Validator Key Compromised | Ethereum | $624.0M |
| 2022-10-06 | Binance Bridge | Bridge & Cross-Chain | Proof Verifier Bug | BSC | $570.0M |
| 2022-11-12 | FTX | Social Engineering | Phishing | Ethereum, Solana | $450.0M |
| 2022-02-02 | Portal | Input Validation | Signature Verification Flaw | Solana | $326.0M |
| 2022-08-01 | Nomad | Bridge & Cross-Chain | Forged Proof | Ethereum | $190.0M |
| 2022-04-17 | Beanstalk | Governance | Flashloan Governance Attack | Ethereum | $181.0M |
| 2022-09-20 | Wintermute | Social Engineering | Phishing | Ethereum | $160.0M |
| 2022-10-11 | Mango Markets V3 | Oracle Manipulation | Spot Price Manipulation | Solana | $115.0M |
| 2022-06-23 | Harmony Bridge | Key Compromise | Validator Key Compromised | Ethereum, BSC | $100.0M |
| 2022-05-01 | Rari Capital | Reentrancy | Reentrancy | Ethereum, Arbitrum | $80.0M |
| 2022-01-28 | Qubit | Input Validation | Missing Input Validation | BSC | $80.0M |
| 2022-03-23 | Cashio | Input Validation | Missing Input Validation | Solana | $52.8M |
Source: DefiLlama, retrieved 22 November 2026, under its open methodology. Figures are a dated snapshot, not a live feed.