Hacks
Nomad, 1 August 2022
Data as of 22 November 2026
DefiLlama's record lists Nomad on 1 August 2022, with $190.0M lost on Ethereum, classed as Bridge & Cross-Chain, technique Forged Proof. By amount it is the 24th largest of 1,373 incidents in the record, and the 5th largest of 2022. The account below is ours, written from the sources it links; the figures are DefiLlama's, as of 22 November 2026, and the record does not say whether they are before or after any recovery.
- Amount recorded$190.0M
- Date1 August 2022
- ClassBridge & Cross-Chain
- TechniqueForged Proof
What happened
Nomad was a cross-chain messaging protocol whose token bridge moved assets between Ethereum, Moonbeam and other chains. On 1 August 2022 it was drained of about $190 million, Immunefi reports. The incident came to light through transactions in which sending 0.01 WBTC to the bridge from Moonbeam released 100 WBTC on Ethereum, Halborn says. After the first attacker succeeded, others copied the method. Anyone who could decode the message format could swap in their own address as recipient and resubmit the transaction, Immunefi explains. That turned the theft into what it calls a “crowdsourced” hack.
How it worked
Nomad’s root-cause
analysis
traces the failure to the Replica contract, which authenticates inbound messages
on each chain. Replica keeps two mappings. One records when each Merkle root
becomes valid. The other records the root under which each message was proven.
In Solidity an unset entry reads as zero, so any message that has never been
proven maps to a root of zero. The check acceptableRoot was meant to reject
such a root, because its validity time would also read as zero.
The initialiser undid that safeguard. When a Replica is set up, it pre-approves
its starting root by setting that root’s validity time to 1. Replicas deployed
at the same time as their corresponding Home contracts started from an empty
message tree, and in Nomad’s implementation an empty tree’s root is zero. The
zero root was therefore marked valid from time 1, which every block timestamp
exceeds. As a result, any unproven message passed the process check. DefiLlama
files the technique as a forged proof; Nomad’s analysis says these messages were
processed without ever being proven.
The vulnerable code arrived in an upgrade deployed on 21 June 2022 on Ethereum,
Moonbeam and four other chains, Nomad says. Before it, process required a
message to be explicitly marked as proven. Nomad made the change on 26 May,
during an audit by Quantstamp, and included it in the code submitted for
re-audit. Nomad’s watchers, which look for a compromised updater key, did not
react, because the forged messages needed no updater signature.
Afterwards
Nomad unenrolled the Replicas from its bridge and governance contracts, which stopped the bridge processing any message, and disabled the bridge’s interface. It then offered a bounty of up to 10 per cent. Anyone who returned at least 90 per cent of what they took would count as a white hat, and Nomad would not pursue legal action against them. Nomad said it was working with law enforcement and blockchain analysis firms, and published an official recovery address. Some of the accounts that drained funds did return them, Immunefi says, adding that Nomad planned to relaunch the bridge and share the recovered assets among users pro rata.
Account reviewed 22 November 2026. The facts in it come from the sources linked in the text; the figures above are DefiLlama's record, which places it on Ethereum and files the target as DeFi Protocol.
In DefiLlama's record
| Date | Incident | Class | Technique | Chains | Amount |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022-08-01 | Nomad | Bridge & Cross-Chain | Forged Proof | Ethereum | $190.0M |
More from the record: every incident in 2022, Bridge & Cross-Chain, and the whole record.
Other large incidents in 2022
| Date | Incident | Class | Technique | Chains | Amount |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022-03-23 | Ronin Bridge | Key Compromise | Validator Key Compromised | Ethereum | $624.0M |
| 2022-10-06 | Binance Bridge | Bridge & Cross-Chain | Proof Verifier Bug | BSC | $570.0M |
| 2022-11-12 | FTX | Social Engineering | Phishing | Ethereum, Solana | $450.0M |
| 2022-02-02 | Portal | Input Validation | Signature Verification Flaw | Solana | $326.0M |
| 2022-04-17 | Beanstalk | Governance | Flashloan Governance Attack | Ethereum | $181.0M |
| 2022-09-20 | Wintermute | Social Engineering | Phishing | Ethereum | $160.0M |
| 2022-10-11 | Mango Markets V3 | Oracle Manipulation | Spot Price Manipulation | Solana | $115.0M |
| 2022-06-05 | Elrond | Token & Share Accounting | Infinite Mint | MultiversX | $113.0M |
| 2022-06-23 | Harmony Bridge | Key Compromise | Validator Key Compromised | Ethereum, BSC | $100.0M |
| 2022-05-01 | Rari Capital | Reentrancy | Reentrancy | Ethereum, Arbitrum | $80.0M |
| 2022-01-28 | Qubit | Input Validation | Missing Input Validation | BSC | $80.0M |
| 2022-03-23 | Cashio | Input Validation | Missing Input Validation | Solana | $52.8M |
Source: DefiLlama, retrieved 22 November 2026, under its open methodology. Figures are a dated snapshot, not a live feed.