Hacks
Portal, 2 February 2022
Data as of 22 November 2026
DefiLlama's record lists Portal on 2 February 2022, with $326.0M lost on Solana, classed as Input Validation, technique Signature Verification Flaw. By amount it is the 11th largest of 1,373 incidents in the record, and the 4th largest of 2022. The account below is ours, written from the sources it links; the figures are DefiLlama's, as of 22 November 2026, and the record does not say whether they are before or after any recovery.
- Amount recorded$326.0M
- Date2 February 2022
- ClassInput Validation
- TechniqueSignature Verification Flaw
What happened
Portal is a token bridge built on Wormhole, a cross-chain messaging network. Wormhole is run by 19 “Guardians”, and a message counts as authentic once at least two-thirds of them have signed it, Wormhole’s incident report explains. Users lock tokens in Portal’s contract on one chain. Portal then mints wrapped versions on another chain once it receives such a message. At 18:24 UTC on 2 February 2022 an unidentified attacker made the Solana-side contract mint 120,000 wrapped ether with no ether deposited behind them. The attacker sent 93,750 of these back to Ethereum and redeemed them for ether held by the bridge. The rest were swapped for SOL on Solana. Wormhole contributors noticed the shortfall during a routine check at 19:07 UTC.
How it worked
On Solana, Portal’s minting relied on Wormhole’s verify_signatures function.
That function reads the instruction sysvar, an account the Solana runtime fills
in and programs therefore trust. Solana lets a caller pass in any accounts it
chooses, so each program must check that it received the ones it expects.
verify_signatures did not check that the account it was given was the genuine
sysvar. The attacker built an account that imitated the sysvar and passed it in.
The function then treated the Guardian signatures as verified. That made it
possible to forge any Wormhole message bound for Solana, including one telling
Portal to mint wrapped tokens. The fix added the missing check.
A public commit would have closed the gap, the report adds: a routine upgrade to Solana toolchain 1.9.4, whose newer functions include that check, pushed to the repository on 13 January and awaiting audit before the next release. Wormhole said the attacker may have noticed the vulnerability because the commit was public.
Afterwards
Transfers paused at 19:40 UTC, once six Guardians had stopped relaying messages. The auditing firm Neodyme closed the flaw at 00:32 UTC on 3 February by using the vulnerability itself to carry the upgrade through. A second upgrade blacklisted forged messages the attacker had already prepared. Jump Crypto refilled the contract with 120,000 ether at 13:08 UTC, and Portal came back online at 13:29 UTC, about 16 hours after the attack. The attacker had not answered a $10 million white-hat offer when the report was published. Wormhole also offered $10 million for information leading to an arrest and conviction or to recovery of the funds.
A year later Oasis, which makes the wallet software into which the attacker had deposited funds, said it had seized assets tied to the exploit, CoinDesk reported. It acted after a 21 February 2023 order from the High Court of England and Wales. Oasis said it had used a previously unknown vulnerability in its admin multisig access, reported to it by white hats, and had passed the assets to an authorised third party. CoinDesk noted that Blockworks had identified Jump Crypto as the owner of the wallets that received them.
Account reviewed 22 November 2026. The facts in it come from the sources linked in the text; the figures above are DefiLlama's record, which places it on Solana and files the target as DeFi Protocol.
In DefiLlama's record
| Date | Incident | Class | Technique | Chains | Amount |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022-02-02 | Portal | Input Validation | Signature Verification Flaw | Solana | $326.0M |
More from the record: every incident in 2022, Input Validation, and the whole record.
Other large incidents in 2022
| Date | Incident | Class | Technique | Chains | Amount |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022-03-23 | Ronin Bridge | Key Compromise | Validator Key Compromised | Ethereum | $624.0M |
| 2022-10-06 | Binance Bridge | Bridge & Cross-Chain | Proof Verifier Bug | BSC | $570.0M |
| 2022-11-12 | FTX | Social Engineering | Phishing | Ethereum, Solana | $450.0M |
| 2022-08-01 | Nomad | Bridge & Cross-Chain | Forged Proof | Ethereum | $190.0M |
| 2022-04-17 | Beanstalk | Governance | Flashloan Governance Attack | Ethereum | $181.0M |
| 2022-09-20 | Wintermute | Social Engineering | Phishing | Ethereum | $160.0M |
| 2022-10-11 | Mango Markets V3 | Oracle Manipulation | Spot Price Manipulation | Solana | $115.0M |
| 2022-06-05 | Elrond | Token & Share Accounting | Infinite Mint | MultiversX | $113.0M |
| 2022-06-23 | Harmony Bridge | Key Compromise | Validator Key Compromised | Ethereum, BSC | $100.0M |
| 2022-05-01 | Rari Capital | Reentrancy | Reentrancy | Ethereum, Arbitrum | $80.0M |
| 2022-01-28 | Qubit | Input Validation | Missing Input Validation | BSC | $80.0M |
| 2022-03-23 | Cashio | Input Validation | Missing Input Validation | Solana | $52.8M |
Source: DefiLlama, retrieved 22 November 2026, under its open methodology. Figures are a dated snapshot, not a live feed.