cryptonist

Hacks

Qubit, 28 January 2022

Data as of 22 November 2026

DefiLlama's record lists Qubit on 28 January 2022, with $80.0M lost on BSC, classed as Input Validation, technique Missing Input Validation. By amount it is the 53rd largest of 1,373 incidents in the record, and the 12th largest of 2022. The account below is ours, written from the sources it links; the figures are DefiLlama's, as of 22 November 2026, and the record does not say whether they are before or after any recovery.

What happened

Qubit Finance was a lending protocol on Binance Smart Chain (BSC). Its QBridge let users post assets held on other networks as collateral, CoinDesk reported. Qubit’s incident timeline shows the attacker’s account receiving just under 0.89 ETH from Tornado Cash at 21:18 UTC on 27 January 2022. Between 21:34 and 21:50 UTC it sent 16 deposit transactions to QBridge on Ethereum. Qubit’s own relayer answered each one with a voteProposal transaction on BSC, which minted xETH. The attacker used that xETH as collateral to withdraw the protocol’s liquidity. Qubit’s second report dates the exploit to 28 January, the date in DefiLlama’s record. CoinDesk cited the security firm PeckShield: addresses linked to the attack drained 206,809 BNB. It also cited CertiK’s count of 77,162 qXETH minted without a real deposit.

How it worked

The Ethereum-side deposit function handed the call to a handler contract. That contract was meant to pull wrapped ether (WETH) from the depositor with safeTransferFrom, Qubit explained. When the team added a separate depositETH function for native ether, the token address registered for that route changed from WETH to the zero address. With the token address set to zero, safeTransferFrom did not fail. deposit completed normally whatever amount the caller named. Halborn’s analysis traces this to a modified safeTransferFrom. It made a low-level call without first checking that the target address held contract code, and a call to an address with no code succeeds. OpenZeppelin’s SafeERC20 library would have reverted. The bridge saw a valid-looking Deposit event and minted qXETH on BSC against nothing.

Qubit’s second report sets out how the old function survived. The bridge contracts went to the audit firm Theori on 1 December 2021. The audit was completed and the depositETH upgrade was deployed on the same day, 13 December, and the internal review that followed concentrated on the new function. The bridge launched on 20 December. The legacy deposit function stayed in the contract. Qubit said the issue was not covered by Theori’s audit, and that the team had not recognised it during development.

Afterwards

Qubit disabled supply, redemption, borrowing, repayment and the bridge. It offered the exploiter the maximum bounty its programme allowed and said it was working with Binance, according to its first report. It also messaged the attacker through a note attached to a transaction, The Record reported. At that point the stolen funds had not been laundered.

On 8 February Qubit wrote that the exploiter had moved some funds into Tornado Cash. Qubit had filed reports with law enforcement in several countries, and it offered up to $500,000 for information leading to the attacker’s identification and apprehension. Mound, the team behind Qubit, said it would give up all its own tokens and take on debt to compensate users. It planned a first tranche of at least $10 million, to be invested by an asset management team to generate returns for that compensation.

Account reviewed 22 November 2026. The facts in it come from the sources linked in the text; the figures above are DefiLlama's record, which places it on BSC and files the target as DeFi Protocol.

In DefiLlama's record

Qubit, as the record lists it. Newest first. Source: DefiLlama.
DateIncidentClass TechniqueChainsAmount
2022-01-28 Qubit Input Validation Missing Input Validation BSC $80.0M

More from the record: every incident in 2022, Input Validation, Missing Input Validation, and the whole record.

Other large incidents in 2022

Incidents in 2022 with a page of their own. Largest first. Source: DefiLlama.
DateIncidentClass TechniqueChainsAmount
2022-03-23 Ronin Bridge Key Compromise Validator Key Compromised Ethereum $624.0M
2022-10-06 Binance Bridge Bridge & Cross-Chain Proof Verifier Bug BSC $570.0M
2022-11-12 FTX Social Engineering Phishing Ethereum, Solana $450.0M
2022-02-02 Portal Input Validation Signature Verification Flaw Solana $326.0M
2022-08-01 Nomad Bridge & Cross-Chain Forged Proof Ethereum $190.0M
2022-04-17 Beanstalk Governance Flashloan Governance Attack Ethereum $181.0M
2022-09-20 Wintermute Social Engineering Phishing Ethereum $160.0M
2022-10-11 Mango Markets V3 Oracle Manipulation Spot Price Manipulation Solana $115.0M
2022-06-05 Elrond Token & Share Accounting Infinite Mint MultiversX $113.0M
2022-06-23 Harmony Bridge Key Compromise Validator Key Compromised Ethereum, BSC $100.0M
2022-05-01 Rari Capital Reentrancy Reentrancy Ethereum, Arbitrum $80.0M
2022-03-23 Cashio Input Validation Missing Input Validation Solana $52.8M

Source: DefiLlama, retrieved 22 November 2026, under its open methodology. Figures are a dated snapshot, not a live feed.