Hacks
Qubit, 28 January 2022
Data as of 22 November 2026
DefiLlama's record lists Qubit on 28 January 2022, with $80.0M lost on BSC, classed as Input Validation, technique Missing Input Validation. By amount it is the 53rd largest of 1,373 incidents in the record, and the 12th largest of 2022. The account below is ours, written from the sources it links; the figures are DefiLlama's, as of 22 November 2026, and the record does not say whether they are before or after any recovery.
- Amount recorded$80.0M
- Date28 January 2022
- ClassInput Validation
- TechniqueMissing Input Validation
What happened
Qubit Finance was a lending protocol on Binance Smart Chain (BSC). Its QBridge
let users post assets held on other networks as collateral, CoinDesk
reported.
Qubit’s incident
timeline
shows the attacker’s account receiving just under 0.89 ETH from Tornado Cash at
21:18 UTC on 27 January 2022. Between 21:34 and 21:50 UTC it sent 16 deposit
transactions to QBridge on Ethereum. Qubit’s own relayer answered each one with
a voteProposal transaction on BSC, which minted xETH. The attacker used that
xETH as collateral to withdraw the protocol’s liquidity. Qubit’s second
report
dates the exploit to 28 January, the date in DefiLlama’s record. CoinDesk cited
the security firm PeckShield: addresses linked to the attack drained 206,809
BNB. It also cited CertiK’s count of 77,162 qXETH minted without a real deposit.
How it worked
The Ethereum-side deposit function handed the call to a handler contract. That
contract was meant to pull wrapped ether (WETH) from the depositor with
safeTransferFrom, Qubit explained. When the team added a separate depositETH
function for native ether, the token address registered for that route changed
from WETH to the zero address. With the token address set to zero,
safeTransferFrom did not fail. deposit completed normally whatever amount
the caller named. Halborn’s
analysis
traces this to a modified safeTransferFrom. It made a low-level call without
first checking that the target address held contract code, and a call to an
address with no code succeeds. OpenZeppelin’s SafeERC20 library would have
reverted. The bridge saw a valid-looking Deposit event and minted qXETH on BSC
against nothing.
Qubit’s second report sets out how the old function survived. The bridge
contracts went to the audit firm Theori on 1 December 2021. The audit was
completed and the depositETH upgrade was deployed on the same day, 13
December, and the internal review that followed concentrated on the new
function. The bridge launched on 20 December. The legacy deposit function
stayed in the contract. Qubit said the issue was not covered by Theori’s audit,
and that the team had not recognised it during development.
Afterwards
Qubit disabled supply, redemption, borrowing, repayment and the bridge. It offered the exploiter the maximum bounty its programme allowed and said it was working with Binance, according to its first report. It also messaged the attacker through a note attached to a transaction, The Record reported. At that point the stolen funds had not been laundered.
On 8 February Qubit wrote that the exploiter had moved some funds into Tornado Cash. Qubit had filed reports with law enforcement in several countries, and it offered up to $500,000 for information leading to the attacker’s identification and apprehension. Mound, the team behind Qubit, said it would give up all its own tokens and take on debt to compensate users. It planned a first tranche of at least $10 million, to be invested by an asset management team to generate returns for that compensation.
Account reviewed 22 November 2026. The facts in it come from the sources linked in the text; the figures above are DefiLlama's record, which places it on BSC and files the target as DeFi Protocol.
In DefiLlama's record
| Date | Incident | Class | Technique | Chains | Amount |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022-01-28 | Qubit | Input Validation | Missing Input Validation | BSC | $80.0M |
More from the record: every incident in 2022, Input Validation, Missing Input Validation, and the whole record.
Other large incidents in 2022
| Date | Incident | Class | Technique | Chains | Amount |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022-03-23 | Ronin Bridge | Key Compromise | Validator Key Compromised | Ethereum | $624.0M |
| 2022-10-06 | Binance Bridge | Bridge & Cross-Chain | Proof Verifier Bug | BSC | $570.0M |
| 2022-11-12 | FTX | Social Engineering | Phishing | Ethereum, Solana | $450.0M |
| 2022-02-02 | Portal | Input Validation | Signature Verification Flaw | Solana | $326.0M |
| 2022-08-01 | Nomad | Bridge & Cross-Chain | Forged Proof | Ethereum | $190.0M |
| 2022-04-17 | Beanstalk | Governance | Flashloan Governance Attack | Ethereum | $181.0M |
| 2022-09-20 | Wintermute | Social Engineering | Phishing | Ethereum | $160.0M |
| 2022-10-11 | Mango Markets V3 | Oracle Manipulation | Spot Price Manipulation | Solana | $115.0M |
| 2022-06-05 | Elrond | Token & Share Accounting | Infinite Mint | MultiversX | $113.0M |
| 2022-06-23 | Harmony Bridge | Key Compromise | Validator Key Compromised | Ethereum, BSC | $100.0M |
| 2022-05-01 | Rari Capital | Reentrancy | Reentrancy | Ethereum, Arbitrum | $80.0M |
| 2022-03-23 | Cashio | Input Validation | Missing Input Validation | Solana | $52.8M |
Source: DefiLlama, retrieved 22 November 2026, under its open methodology. Figures are a dated snapshot, not a live feed.