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Stablecoin depegs: what broke each time

Every stablecoin rests on something outside the token, and a depeg is the moment that dependency is tested. TerraUSD depended on the market value of a second token and collapsed when that value went. USD Coin held part of its reserve at a bank that failed. DAI held USD Coin among its collateral and slipped with it. Each case shows which part of a design carries the risk, which is more useful than the size of the price drop.

Four designs, four dependencies

What holds each kind of peg sets out the first three designs, and where stablecoin supply lives shows how the supply is split between them. The short version needed here is what each one depends on.

A reserve-backed coin depends on its issuer, the assets it holds and the institutions holding those assets, and on the redemption channel staying open. A crypto-collateralised coin depends on the collateral locked behind it and on liquidations working, and it inherits the risk of whatever that collateral is. An algorithmic coin depends on the market value of a second token it can be swapped for. A synthetic coin holds volatile assets and hedges them with short derivative positions, so it depends on the hedge, the venues where the hedge sits and the cost of keeping it open.

The three cases below cover the first three designs. The fourth has a shorter record, and its section describes the mechanism from the issuer’s own documents.

TerraUSD, May 2022: the loop ran backwards

Terraform Labs announced TerraUSD (UST) in or around September 2020. In the account given by federal prosecutors in New York when its co-founder Do Kwon pleaded guilty on 12 August 2025, Terraform’s promotional materials claimed that one UST could always be exchanged for $1 worth of LUNA, the Terra blockchain’s native token, and $1 worth of LUNA for one UST. The chain’s market module specification shows how: a swap burned the coins offered and minted the coins asked for, with a minimum spread of 2% on swaps between Terra stablecoins and LUNA. The peg was the incentive in that swap. A UST trading below a dollar could be swapped for a dollar’s worth of new LUNA, and the UST taken out of circulation.

The swap works only while a dollar’s worth of LUNA can be sold for a dollar. When holders leave UST in large numbers, the LUNA paid out to them is new supply. Its price falls, so each UST swapped needs more LUNA, which pushes the price down further. The mechanism that defends the peg in a small sell-off speeds up the fall in a large one.

Two other parts of the system came into play, as the same release describes them. Anchor Protocol, a lending platform launched in or around March 2021, was one of the applications the prosecutors say were designed to increase users and transactions on the Terra blockchain, and in their words it “offered an approximately 20% annual return for UST deposited in Anchor”. The Luna Foundation Guard, launched in or around January 2022, eventually held reserves in other cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin, purportedly to support the peg. The SEC’s February 2023 announcement of its complaint described UST as a crypto asset security referred to as an “algorithmic stablecoin”.

The peg had broken once before. In the prosecutors’ account in the sentencing release of 11 December 2025, UST dropped below 92 cents in or about May 2021 and Kwon claimed the protocol had restored it on its own. It had not: after the mechanism failed to restore the peg, Kwon reached an agreement with a high-frequency trading firm, which bought large amounts of UST to prop it up. By May 2022 the UST market was about nine times larger by market capitalisation than a year earlier, the peg broke again, and the same account puts investor losses from the crash of UST and LUNA at over $40 billion. Kwon was sentenced that day to 15 years in prison.

What the case says about the design is that the recovery of May 2021 was the evidence offered that the mechanism worked, and it was manufactured. An algorithmic peg cannot be tested by watching it survive small shocks, because a small shock can be absorbed from outside the mechanism without anyone saying so.

USD Coin, March 2023: the reserve was not the problem, the bank was

On Friday 10 March 2023 the California Department of Financial Protection and Innovation closed Silicon Valley Bank and appointed the FDIC as receiver. At that point only insured deposits were protected in full: customers with more than $250,000 were told to contact the FDIC, and uninsured depositors were to receive an advance dividend and a receivership certificate for the rest.

Circle, which issues USD Coin (USDC), held part of the coin’s cash reserve there. Circle’s statement of 12 March 2023 gives the deposit at SVB as $3.3 billion, about 8% of the reserve. Its figures for the whole reserve, shared on 11 March, were 77% ($32.4 billion) in short-dated Treasury bills held in custody at BNY Mellon and 23% ($9.7 billion) in cash, so the SVB deposit was part of the cash.

The Financial Stability Oversight Council’s 2023 annual report (page 44) records what followed. USDC holders redeemed $1.6 billion on the day of Circle’s disclosure. Coinbase and Binance announced temporary pauses on conversions between USDC and US dollars. Over the weekend USDC traded as low as $0.89, and by 15 March, Circle reported, holders had redeemed some $3 billion. The Federal Reserve’s May 2023 Financial Stability Report (page 55) puts the low at 87 cents, so the two official accounts differ on the figure.

The peg came back when the bank risk was removed: the Federal Reserve’s report records that USDC’s price stabilised near $1 after the government stepped in. On Sunday 12 March the Treasury, the Federal Reserve and the FDIC announced a systemic risk exception under which all SVB depositors would have access to all their money from Monday 13 March. Circle said the $3.3 billion would be fully available when US banks opened that morning.

On the USD Coin data page, DefiLlama’s supply history, kept at monthly points that far back in the 22 November 2026 snapshot, reads $42.0B on 1 March 2023 and $32.3B on 1 April. That is a fall of about 23% (computed), and the series does not show how much of it came in the weekend itself.

Three things follow about reserve-backed designs. First, neither official account concerns the Treasury bills. The weak point was the cash, held as an uninsured bank deposit, and the outcome depended on a government decision about that bank’s depositors, not on anything Circle controlled. Second, a full loss of the SVB deposit would have left about 92 cents of reserve per token (computed from Circle’s 8%), and the lows in both official accounts were below that. The market price over the weekend was not a valuation of the reserve. Third, redemption runs on banking days. The bank closed on a Friday and the rescue came on a Sunday, and in between, holders who needed out sold on the market at whatever price it gave. Which reserves a US issuer will be allowed to hold, and how fast it must pay out, is set out in the GENIUS Act.

DAI, the same weekend: collateral that held another coin’s risk

DAI is minted against collateral locked in the Maker Protocol, and on its data page DefiLlama labels it crypto-backed. In 2023 part of that collateral was USDC, held through a peg stability module (PSM) that swapped USDC for DAI at a fixed one for one, less any fee set by governance. Maker’s Risk Core Unit wrote in its emergency proposal of 11 March 2023 that the USDC PSM had historically been Maker’s primary liquidity source, the thing that kept DAI close to its target price.

That made DAI a holder of USDC’s bank risk. The FSOC report states that DAI depegged over the same weekend and that it relied on USDC for approximately 52% of the collateral behind its circulating supply, a figure FSOC cites to CoinDesk. The risk unit’s stated aim was to limit Maker’s exposure to impaired stablecoins while keeping enough liquidity to process liquidations of crypto-collateralised vaults. It proposed a 1% fee on swapping USDC into DAI, cutting the PSM’s daily minting room from 950 million DAI to 250 million, and reducing to zero the debt ceilings of four collateral types made of liquidity positions containing USDC.

The executive vote passed on 11 March 2023. Most of its changes were subject to the protocol’s 48-hour governance delay, and it was executed on 13 March, by which time the US authorities had acted on SVB. The same vote cut the delay to 16 hours so that governance could react faster in the following days. On the DAI data page, DefiLlama’s supply history shows $5.0B on 1 March 2023 and $5.1B on 1 April, so DAI’s supply did not show USDC’s outflow over the month.

The lesson for crypto-collateralised designs is that “crypto-backed” describes the collateral’s form, not its risk. A coin that holds a reserve-backed coin as collateral holds that coin’s issuer, reserves and banks too. The lending mechanics behind vaults and liquidations are in how DeFi lending works. Governance also has a clock: a delay meant to protect holders from a malicious change slows an emergency one as well.

Synthetic designs: a hedge instead of a reserve

Ethena’s USDe is built this way. On its data page DefiLlama labels it crypto-backed, the same label it gives DAI, so the label does not separate the two designs. In Ethena’s own description, volatile backing assets are paired with short futures positions of approximately the same notional size, so that a fall in the asset is offset by a gain on the hedge. Stable assets in the backing need no hedge. Minting and redemption are open to whitelisted users, and Ethena’s peg arbitrage page says about 0.50% of backing assets are typically held as stablecoins in the minting contract for on-demand redemptions, replenished from 4% held in stablecoins with custodians.

The dependencies are different from the other three. Short perpetual positions pay or receive a funding rate, the mechanism described in perpetual futures explained, and Ethena’s documentation names persistently negative funding as a direct risk to revenue and backing, with a reserve fund meant to absorb negative periods. The hedges sit on centralised exchanges. Ethena says the backing is held with off-exchange settlement providers rather than deposited with exchanges, which limits its exposure to an exchange’s failure to the profit and loss outstanding between settlement cycles.

The design is the newest of the four and its record under stress is the shortest. Among the risks its documentation names are a market where funding stays negative and an exchange that fails. The stablecoins and short-dated assets in its backing carry their own issuers’ risks, the dependency DAI showed in 2023.

What to check when a stablecoin slips

The first question, as the stablecoin explainer puts it, is whether the token can still be redeemed and by whom. The cases add a second: what is the peg waiting on? Each recovery or collapse above turned on something outside the token, and that dependency is where to look first.

  1. Name the dependency. A bank and its depositors for reserve-backed coins, the collateral and whatever it contains for crypto-collateralised ones, a second token’s price for algorithmic ones, funding and venues for synthetic ones.
  2. Check the calendar. A reserve that redeems through banks is shut at weekends. A protocol with a governance delay cannot change its parameters faster than the delay allows.
  3. Separate the price from the backing. USDC’s weekend low was below what a total loss of the SVB deposit would have implied, and on the Sunday Circle said the coin remained redeemable one for one. Terra’s recovery in 2021 looked like a working mechanism and was, in the prosecutors’ account, a purchase. A reserve report describes the backing at one date, and what proof of reserves actually proves sets out how narrow that is.
  4. Read the supply series afterwards, not during. A supply figure counts tokens outstanding. It does not show whether holders left in an orderly way or fled, and each stablecoin data page says in its opening that supply is not a measure of reserves or of whether the peg is holding.