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The GENIUS Act: what the US stablecoin law requires
The GENIUS Act is the first US federal law written for stablecoins. It decides who may issue a payment stablecoin in the United States, what must sit behind it, what the issuer must publish and how a holder gets money back, and it bars issuers from paying holders interest. Most of it does not apply yet: the law takes effect on 18 January 2027, and only one of the four federal regulators it names had issued a final rule two months before that date. What follows describes the statute and the rules written under it so far. It is not legal advice.
The law, and how it passed
The Act began as Senate bill S. 1582. Its full name is the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act, and it is Public Law 119-27 in the Government Publishing Office’s text, which records that the Senate passed it on 17 June 2025, the House on 17 July, and that it was approved on 18 July 2025. The House vote was 308 to 122, with two members not voting. A Federal Register notice from FinCEN and the Federal Reserve on 9 November 2026 gives the same enactment date and public law number.
The law is about one kind of token, which it calls a payment stablecoin. Under section 2(22), that is a digital asset used, or designed to be used, for payment or settlement whose issuer is obliged to convert, redeem or repurchase it for a fixed amount of monetary value, and represents that it will hold a stable value against that amount. Monetary value means a national currency, or a deposit denominated in one (section 2(17)). The definition excludes national currency, bank deposits (including deposits recorded on a distributed ledger) and securities.
The definition turns on a promise to pay monetary value, and it says in terms that a digital asset denominated in a fixed amount of monetary value, another stablecoin for instance, does not count as that payment. A token held at a dollar by an arbitrage loop against a second token, the design the stablecoin explainer calls algorithmic, offers at most a dollar’s worth of that second token. Section 14 does not regulate such tokens either. It orders the Treasury to study non-payment stablecoins, including what it calls “endogenously collateralized payment stablecoins”: tokens whose originator has promised redemption for a fixed amount of monetary value but which rely solely on another digital asset from the same originator to hold their price. The report was due to Congress within 365 days of enactment.
Who may issue one
Section 3(a) makes it unlawful for anyone other than a permitted payment stablecoin issuer to issue a payment stablecoin in the United States. A person who knowingly takes part in a breach faces a fine of up to $1,000,000 per violation, up to five years in prison, or both. Section 2(23) allows three kinds of permitted issuer, each formed in the United States:
- a subsidiary of an insured bank or credit union, approved by that institution’s federal regulator;
- a federal qualified issuer, which is a nonbank, an uninsured national bank or a federal branch of a foreign bank approved by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC);
- a state qualified issuer, approved by a state regulator.
The state route has a ceiling. A state qualified issuer with no more than $10 billion outstanding may opt for a state regime, provided that regime is “substantially similar” to the federal one. The Treasury sets the principles for judging that, and a Stablecoin Certification Review Committee, chaired by the Treasury Secretary, approves each state’s certification (section 4(c)). Above $10 billion the issuer must either move into the federal framework within 360 days, supervised jointly by its state regulator and a federal one, or stop issuing new tokens until it is back under the line, unless the federal regulator grants a waiver (section 4(d)).
The law also reaches the venues. From three years after enactment, which falls on 18 July 2028, a digital asset service provider may not offer or sell a payment stablecoin to a person in the United States unless a permitted issuer issued it (section 3(b)). A token from a foreign issuer may be offered only if that issuer can comply, and will comply, with US lawful orders, and section 18 lets the Treasury recognise foreign regimes it judges comparable. Transfers between two individuals without an intermediary, and self-custody wallets, are exempt (section 3(h)). For what US registration otherwise means for an exchange, see what a regulated exchange is regulated for.
What has to sit behind the token
Section 4(a)(1)(A) requires identifiable reserves backing the tokens outstanding on at least a one-to-one basis, held in a closed list of assets:
- US coins and currency, or balances at a Federal Reserve Bank;
- demand deposits, or other deposits withdrawable on request, at an insured bank or credit union;
- Treasury bills, notes or bonds with 93 days or less to maturity;
- overnight repurchase and reverse repurchase agreements backed by Treasuries;
- shares of registered government money market funds that hold only the assets above;
- other similarly liquid federal government assets a regulator approves, and tokenised forms of most of the assets above.
The reserves may not be pledged or reused except in narrow cases, such as meeting redemptions through short repo (section 4(a)(2)).
Disclosure is monthly. The issuer must publish on its website the number of tokens outstanding and the amount and composition of the reserves, including their average tenor and where each category is held (section 4(a)(1)(C)). A registered public accounting firm must examine that report every month, and the chief executive and chief financial officer must certify it to the regulator, with criminal penalties for a certification they know to be false (section 4(a)(3)). An issuer with more than $50 billion outstanding that does not already file reports with the SEC must also publish audited annual financial statements (section 4(a)(10)).
For scale: as of 22 November 2026, per DefiLlama, two coins on the stablecoin data pages had more than $50 billion outstanding, Tether (USDT) at $174.5B and USD Coin (USDC) at $68.7B. The threshold applies to a permitted issuer’s consolidated issuance, and the data pages do not record which issuers will become permitted ones. How supply is split between issuers and chains is in where stablecoin supply lives.
Two provisions concern what happens if an issuer fails. Section 4(e) states that payment stablecoins are not backed by the full faith and credit of the United States and are not covered by federal deposit insurance, and makes it unlawful to claim otherwise. Section 11 gives holders, ratably among themselves, priority over every other claim on the required reserves in an issuer’s insolvency, and keeps those reserves out of the bankruptcy estate. It does not free redemptions from the automatic stay: it adds them to what the stay covers, and lets the court lift the stay to pay holders ratably from the reserves, using its best efforts to order distributions within 14 days of the hearing.
Redemption
The statute does not say how fast a holder must be paid. Section 4(a)(1)(B) requires a published redemption policy with clear procedures for “timely” redemption, and disclosure in plain language of every fee for buying or redeeming. A fee can be changed only on seven days’ notice to consumers, and only a regulator can impose discretionary limits on timely redemption.
The OCC filled in the timing for issuers it supervises. Its final rule provides that timely redemption may not exceed two business days after the request (§ 15.12(c), summarised at page 586 of the rule as released). In its discussion of comments the OCC calls the two days a ceiling. It also says a stablecoin may need an on-demand contractual right to count as a cash equivalent under accounting rules (page 244). The clock starts when the issuer receives the request or, where its onboarding procedures are designed not to delay customers unduly, once the customer has been onboarded; and the issuer must redeem any amount of one token or more, subject to screening and onboarding (§ 15.12(a) and (b)). An issuer that receives requests above 10% of a coin’s outstanding issuance in 24 hours may ask the OCC to extend the period (§ 15.12(d)).
The ban on issuer interest
Section 4(a)(11) is one sentence. No permitted issuer or foreign issuer may pay a holder “any form of interest or yield (whether in cash, tokens, or other consideration) solely in connection with the holding, use, or retention” of the stablecoin.
Two features of the wording matter. It names issuers and no one else. And the word “solely” limits it to payments made for holding the token and nothing more. The OCC’s March 2026 proposal had tried to cover payments through partners: it would have presumed a breach, unless the issuer rebutted it, where an issuer paid an affiliate or a related third party, which then paid holders. The final rule drops that presumption. In its explanation the OCC says that interest paid by an agent on the issuer’s behalf is within the ban. It also says that indirect payments not made solely in connection with holding, using or retaining the token fall outside it “by the Act’s own terms”. It applies the ban equally to retail and institutional holders and says it keeps its authority to act against evasion (pages 98 to 103).
The result is narrower than the European rule. Where a return is offered on a dollar stablecoin, the question is still who pays and for what, the method set out in where crypto yield comes from. A fund that passes Treasury income through to its holders is a different instrument, regulated as a security; tokenised Treasury funds covers how those are built.
What it leaves to regulators, and when it applies
Much of the detail is delegated. The federal regulators must write capital, liquidity, reserve diversification and risk-management rules (section 4(a)(4)). The Treasury must write anti-money-laundering rules for issuers and the principles for judging state regimes. Section 13 gave every regulator one year from enactment, to 18 July 2026, to issue its rules.
That deadline passed with no final rule under the Act in the Federal Register. The OCC announced its final rule on 21 October 2026, and it was published on 23 October with an effective date of 18 January 2027. According to OCC Bulletin 2026-50, it covers reserves, redemption, risk management, audits, custody, applications and capital, and leaves anti-money-laundering and sanctions requirements to a separate rulemaking with the Treasury. The other primary regulators had only proposals out. The FDIC proposed its approval rules in December 2025 and its requirements for the issuers it supervises in April 2026; the NCUA proposed licensing rules in February and standards in May; and the Federal Reserve published its proposals in September. The Treasury proposed its principles for state regimes in April and its rules on issuance, offer and sale in August. A search of the Federal Register on 22 November 2026 returned no other final rule implementing the Act, beyond an interim final rule setting the forms and procedures for the committee that reviews state certifications.
The effective date is set by section 20: the earlier of 18 months after enactment, or 120 days after the primary federal regulators issue any final regulations. Eighteen months from 18 July 2025 is 18 January 2027. The OCC’s rule came too late to bring that forward, since 120 days from October runs into February, and the OCC’s release says the Act and its rule take effect on 18 January 2027.
How it compares with MiCA
The EU’s rules for single-currency tokens, which MiCA explained places in the wider regulation, solve the same problem with different choices. The articles are in Regulation (EU) 2023/1114, and the e-money token title has applied since 30 June 2024 (Article 149(3)).
Who may issue. MiCA requires an issuer of e-money tokens to be a credit institution or an electronic money institution (Article 48), and deems the tokens to be electronic money. GENIUS creates a new category of permitted issuer, including approved nonbanks, and says a payment stablecoin from a permitted issuer is not a security or a commodity (section 17).
Reserves. MiCA requires at least 30% of the funds received to be held in separate accounts at credit institutions and the rest in highly liquid, low-risk instruments in the same currency (Article 54); issuers of tokens classed as significant face further requirements (Article 58). GENIUS sets no deposit minimum but lists the eligible assets.
Redemption. MiCA gives the holder a claim on the issuer and a right to redeem at par at any time, with no fee (Article 49). GENIUS requires timely redemption under a published policy and allows disclosed fees; the OCC’s two-business-day ceiling applies to issuers it supervises.
Interest. Both ban it, but MiCA’s ban is wider. Article 50 covers issuers and crypto-asset service providers. It counts any benefit tied to how long a token is held as interest, including one that comes from third parties. The US ban covers issuers, and only payments made solely for holding, using or retaining the token.
Neither regime covers every token that calls itself a stablecoin, and neither is deposit insurance.
What is still open
The rules that will govern most issuers do not exist yet in final form: the FDIC’s, the Federal Reserve’s and the NCUA’s, the Treasury’s substantive rules and the anti-money-laundering rules all remain proposals. Which existing issuers will apply to become permitted issuers, and which foreign regimes the Treasury will treat as comparable, will only show once applications are processed; the OCC said it would announce separately when it starts accepting them. The venue ban does not bite until July 2028. How the narrow wording of the interest ban will be applied to rewards paid by exchanges is a question the OCC answered by principle rather than by list, and further cases will come up as products do.
How the law treats a token in a crisis is the other open question, and no permitted issuer has yet been through one. Stablecoin depegs works through what failed in past cases.