cryptonist

Hacks

Badger DAO, 2 December 2021

Data as of 22 November 2026

DefiLlama's record lists Badger DAO on 2 December 2021, with $120.0M lost on Ethereum, classed as Frontend & Infrastructure, technique CDN Compromise. By amount it is the 37th largest of 1,373 incidents in the record, and the 7th largest of 2021. The account below is ours, written from the sources it links; the figures are DefiLlama's, as of 22 November 2026, and the record does not say whether they are before or after any recovery.

What happened

On 2 December 2021 a series of unauthorised transactions took funds from the wallets of Badger users. A community member raised the alarm at about 02:05 UTC, after some 900 BTC left the Yearn wBTC vault (Badger). Summarising Badger’s report, CoinDesk put the theft at $130 million, of which about $9 million had been moved by the attacker but not yet withdrawn from Badger’s vaults.

How it worked

The attack came through Badger’s web front end, not its contracts. Users on a Cloudflare community forum reported in late September that unauthorised people could create accounts and view global API keys before the email address was verified, and so keep API access once the owner completed verification. After the theft Badger found unauthorised account creation and API key generation for three of its accounts in August and September, and it had itself finished setting up one of them in mid-September without realising (Badger).

From 10 November the attacker used that access to inject a script through Cloudflare Workers into app.badger.com. The script intercepted web3 transactions and asked users to sign approve or increaseAllowance calls letting the attacker’s address spend their ERC-20 tokens; the first malicious approval landed on 20 November. To avoid notice the script was switched on and off for short spells, targeted only wallets above a certain balance, skipped the signers of Badger’s developer multisig, and changed on every deployment. Once enough approvals were collected, a funding account sent 8 ETH to the attacker’s address, which used transferFrom to move users’ tokens; the funds were liquidated and left as bitcoin through the Badger Bridge (Badger).

Afterwards

Badger began pausing vault and strategy contracts at 03:14 UTC and had most paused by 03:30, after which the attacker’s transferFrom calls failed. It rotated its Cloudflare credentials, confirmed that Cloudflare had closed the flaw, and worked with Mandiant, Chainalysis, exchanges and authorities in the US and Canada (Badger).

The DAO then proposed contract upgrades to seize about $9.2 million of vault tokens still at the attacker’s address, and a grant of BADGER from the treasury to restore victims’ voting power (CoinDesk). Its review of 2022 says $10 million of USDC was spent on bitcoin for victims and BADGER was paid out through a remBADGER vault, with about $59 million of the restitution still outstanding at the end of that year (BadgerDAO).

Account reviewed 22 November 2026. The facts in it come from the sources linked in the text; the figures above are DefiLlama's record, which places it on Ethereum and files the target as DeFi Protocol.

In DefiLlama's record

Badger DAO, as the record lists it. Newest first. Source: DefiLlama.
DateIncidentClass TechniqueChainsAmount
2021-12-02 Badger DAO Frontend & Infrastructure CDN Compromise Ethereum $120.0M

More from the record: every incident in 2021, Frontend & Infrastructure, and the whole record.

Other large incidents in 2021

Source: DefiLlama, retrieved 22 November 2026, under its open methodology. Figures are a dated snapshot, not a live feed.