Explainers
Rug pulls explained: how a token's insiders take the money
A rug pull is the people behind a crypto project taking investors’ money and leaving with it. In a token, the exit runs through a small number of mechanisms: the liquidity pool, the power to create new tokens, and the rules that decide who may transfer. Most of them leave something on-chain that can be read before money goes in. DefiLlama’s incident record, as of 22 November 2026, classes 42 incidents, with $284.7 million in recorded losses, as rug pulls.
What the term means
US prosecutors have defined it in a charging announcement. In March 2022 the US Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York charged two men over an NFT project called Frosties. The release, as republished by IRS Criminal Investigation, describes a “rug pull” as a scenario where the creator of an NFT or gaming project solicits investments, then abruptly abandons the project and fraudulently keeps the investors’ funds. According to the complaint, the official Frosties website promised holders giveaways, early access to a metaverse game and mint passes to later seasons. It alleges that within hours of selling out the pair abandoned the project, deactivated the website and moved about $1.1 million in crypto to wallets they controlled, in transactions designed to obscure where it came from. The release says every fact it describes should be treated as an allegation.
The SEC used the word for a more specific mechanism in Litigation Release No. 26223 of 16 January 2025: absent safeguards, holders of liquidity-pool tokens can, without warning, withdraw liquidity from a pool, sell significant amounts of crypto assets into it and cause losses to investors.
The two definitions share a feature that separates a rug pull from a hack. In a hack, an outsider finds a flaw. In a rug pull, someone with privileged control (over the pool, the supply, the transfer rules or the treasury) uses it as designed. DefiLlama’s record keeps both kinds in one dataset, with a class for each, and how crypto gets hacked reads it whole.
Liquidity pulls
A token needs no exchange listing to trade. On an automated market maker anyone can create a market for it, and Uniswap’s documentation for its version 2 pools sets out the parts that matter. A pool holds a pair of tokens; whoever seeds it first sets the starting price; anyone who deposits receives liquidity tokens representing their share; and to take the underlying assets back out, a provider “burns” those liquidity tokens. The liquidity tokens are themselves ordinary tokens that can be sold or transferred. What an AMM is explains the pricing.
That is enough to describe the simplest rug. A team creates a token, pairs it with ether or a stablecoin and keeps the liquidity tokens. Buyers swap ether in, so the pool’s ether side grows with every purchase. Whoever holds the liquidity tokens can burn them and withdraw both sides of the pool, including the ether buyers paid in, which leaves holders with a token and nothing to sell it into. The token still exists; its market does not. Depth, not a listing, is what lets a position be sold, a point made at length in deep liquidity and a long coin list pull against each other.
The SEC’s release describes this in a case the defendant agreed to settle. It alleges that a blockchain engineer hired for coding work on a token called Game Coin kept the liquidity tokens unlocked and used them for a rug pull, misappropriating crypto assets worth about $553,000 and causing the token’s price to fall about 12%. He agreed, without admitting or denying the allegations, to pay $672,992 in disgorgement and interest and a $150,000 civil penalty, subject to court approval.
Projects answer this risk by saying the liquidity is “locked”: the liquidity tokens are held by a contract that will not release them before a date, or sent to an address nobody controls. That is a claim about where the liquidity tokens are, and it can be checked, because those tokens sit at an address like any other. It is not a property of the token. In the SafeMoon case, an IRS Criminal Investigation release on the sentencing says investors were told the project relied on “locked” liquidity pools that stopped insiders from pulling liquidity, while the chief executive and others in fact kept access to the pools and used it to divert millions of dollars’ worth of tokens. A federal jury convicted him in May 2025, and on 10 February 2026 he was sentenced to 100 months in prison for conspiracy to commit securities fraud, wire fraud and money laundering. The word was the claim. The access was the fact.
What the contract lets its owner do
The token standard on Ethereum, ERC-20,
specifies an interface: the names of functions such as transfer and the
events they must emit. It does not specify what a contract does beyond that.
It says a contract that creates new tokens should emit a Transfer event from
the zero address, which is how an explorer can show minting, but it does not
stop a contract from minting, and “should” is not “must”.
In OpenZeppelin’s ERC-20
implementation,
every transfer, mint and burn runs through one internal function, _update,
and the code comment says all customisations to transfers, mints and burns
should be made by overriding it. In a token built on it, a fee on transfers, a
pause, a blacklist or a block on selling would all be written there.
A function that lets an owner create tokens after launch gives one key control of the supply. Minted tokens sold into the pool drain its other side, so for holders the result is the same as a liquidity pull, reached by a different route. The tokenomics piece describes how to find a mint path in verified source and who can call it.
Blacklists, pauses and upgradeable code have legitimate uses, which is why
their presence alone proves nothing. The contracts behind Circle’s
stablecoins
document all of them: a pauser address that can freeze all transfers, a
blacklister that can stop an address sending or receiving, a masterMinter
that decides who may mint and how much, and a proxy whose owner can deploy new
code. The Blacklistable
source
shows the owner replacing the blacklister with one call. The same functions in
a token from an anonymous deployer, undisclosed to buyers, mean one address can
create supply, stop any holder from selling, or swap the code. What decides the
risk is who holds each role, whether it was disclosed, and who can change it.
A multisig holding a role is only as good as its signers and threshold, which
can themselves be changed, as the Pepe coin piece shows.
Honeypots: tokens that can be bought but not sold
Selling a token into a pool means transferring it from the seller to the pool’s contract. Buying means the pool’s contract transferring it to the buyer. A contract whose transfer logic rejects transfers into the pool, except from addresses on an allow list, lets every purchase through and makes every ordinary sale fail. A contract can reach the same result with a sale fee that its owner is able to raise to the whole amount.
From outside, a honeypot can look like a token that only goes up. The chart records purchases, because sales are failing, and in a pool the price rises with each one. A chart shows what the contract allowed to happen, not what buyers would do if they could, and the same caution applies to activity figures generally: what wash trading is explains how volume itself can be manufactured.
The check is in the code: a condition in the transfer path that treats the pool’s address differently from other recipients, or a function that lets an owner set a sale fee or an allow list. A contract whose source has not been verified on an explorer cannot be read this way at all. And a switch the owner still holds can be turned on after launch, so a sale that succeeded last week says nothing about next week while the switch exists.
Slow rugs
Not every exit is a single transaction. In what is often called a slow rug, the insiders sell their allocation in pieces, or mint and sell steadily, or move treasury funds out over weeks, while the project keeps announcing plans. Each transaction on its own looks like ordinary selling, and that is the point.
Insiders selling is not, in itself, fraud: a team can hold tokens and sell them on a disclosed schedule. It becomes the pattern described here when it contradicts what holders were told. The SafeMoon release gives an example: it says that while the chief executive and his co-conspirators publicly denied that they held or traded the token, they repeatedly bought and sold it. What a holder can watch is public, if tedious: transfers from team and treasury addresses to exchanges or to the pool, changes in total supply, and whether vesting contracts release on the dates the documents give, all of which the tokenomics piece explains how to read.
What DefiLlama’s record holds
DefiLlama’s hacks record includes a class called Rugpull, published here on its data page. As of 22 November 2026, per DefiLlama, it holds 42 incidents and $284.7 million in recorded losses, dated from February 2019 to May 2026. That is 3.1% of the record’s 1,373 incidents and 1.0% of its value (computed). Within the class, DefiLlama’s technique labels are Admin Drain (21 incidents), Liquidity Rug (9), Backdoor Contract (8), Exit Scam (2) and Treasury Misappropriation (2). Nine incidents of $10 million or more hold 78.2% of the class’s value (computed), and two rows carry an amount of zero.
Three limits apply. DefiLlama does not state how an incident enters the record or which date’s prices an amount uses, so the total cannot be read as a measure of every rug pull, and the record cannot show how many never became a row. Each incident carries one class, and DefiLlama does not say who assigns it. And a row in this class is DefiLlama’s label, not a finding by a regulator or a court, which is why this piece names none of them. The cases named above come from law-enforcement and SEC releases. How crypto gets hacked reads the whole record by class, and the hacks data pages carry it by year, chain and technique.
What to check before buying a token
None of these checks shows that a token is safe. They show which exits are possible and who can take them.
- Who holds the liquidity tokens. In a Uniswap v2-style pool the liquidity tokens are ordinary tokens, so an explorer’s holder list for the pool shows who can withdraw. If they are said to be locked, find the contract holding them and read when it releases them and to whom; if they are said to be burned, check the address they went to. (Later Uniswap versions record positions differently: version 3 wraps each position in the ERC-721 non-fungible token interface, so the check changes with the venue.)
- Whether the source is verified, and what it allows. A mint function, and who can call it. Any function that can pause transfers, blacklist an address, set a sale fee or keep an allow list.
- Who owns the contract, and whether it is a proxy. A single key, a multisig and a governance contract are different assurances.
- Where the supply sits. How much is held by a few addresses, and whether those are identifiable as team, exchange or pool.
- Whether the trading looks like trading. Sales as well as purchases, from many addresses.
Someone who has lost money to a token may then be offered help getting it back, for a fee, which is the pattern described in recovery scams. A platform that shows token gains but demands payment before releasing them is running a different scheme, covered in the withdrawal fee scam, and how to check if a crypto platform is legit turns the same habit of checking claims against evidence on the platforms themselves. Promises of returns attached to a token deserve the arithmetic test that can you trust cloud mining applies to mining contracts: what would have to be true for the terms to be met.