cryptonist

Hacks

Kelp, 18 April 2026

Data as of 22 November 2026

DefiLlama's record lists Kelp on 18 April 2026, with $293.0M lost across 2 chains, classed as Bridge & Cross-Chain, technique Cross-Chain Message Spoofing. By amount it is the 15th largest of 1,373 incidents in the record, and the 5th largest of 2026. The account below is ours, written from the sources it links; the figures are DefiLlama's, as of 22 November 2026, and the record does not say whether they are before or after any recovery.

What happened

Kelp DAO issues rsETH, a liquid restaking token, and uses a LayerZero adapter to carry it to about 20 other chains. Tokens bridged out of Ethereum are locked in a mainnet escrow and released when a cross-chain message reports their return (Galaxy Research). At 17:35 UTC on 18 April 2026 the adapter accepted a forged message, presented as coming from Unichain, and released 116,500 rsETH to the attacker in a single transaction. Kelp paused its contracts 46 minutes later, and two follow-up attempts failed (Galaxy Research).

The rsETH went in as collateral on Aave, Compound and Euler, against which, by Galaxy’s estimate, the attacker borrowed $236m in WETH and wstETH. Aave froze its rsETH markets, and LlamaRisk modelling cited by Galaxy put Aave’s bad debt at between $123.7m and $230.1m, depending on how the shortfall was shared (Galaxy Research).

How it worked

LayerZero lets each application choose which verifiers, called DVNs, must attest a message before it is delivered. Kelp’s rsETH relied on one, operated by LayerZero Labs (LayerZero). In LayerZero’s account, the attacker obtained the list of RPC nodes that verifier used, compromised two of them and replaced the op-geth binaries they ran. The altered nodes showed the forged transaction only to the verifier and answered every other caller truthfully, and a DDoS attack on the remaining RPCs forced the verifier to fail over to them. It then confirmed a transaction that never took place. LayerZero said its keys and DVN instances were not breached. The attribution is LayerZero’s own and preliminary: it said early indicators pointed to North Korea’s Lazarus Group, more specifically TraderTraitor (LayerZero). DefiLlama’s record says the RPC nodes were compromised through social engineering; LayerZero’s statement does not, and Galaxy read it as ruling that out (Galaxy Research).

Responsibility for the single-verifier setting was disputed. LayerZero said it had recommended several verifiers to Kelp (LayerZero); Kelp replied that one-of-one was LayerZero’s documented default (CoinDesk). In May LayerZero apologised, conceding it had been wrong to let its own verifier act alone for high-value transfers (The Block).

Afterwards

Arbitrum’s Security Council moved the 30,766 ETH the attacker had bridged to Arbitrum into a wallet that only Arbitrum governance can release (Galaxy Research). An Aave-led coalition, DeFi United, raised more than $300m in ETH to convert into rsETH for the affected lockbox contract, and planned to clear the affected positions on Aave, with Compound expected to clear the attacker’s position (The Block). LayerZero committed 10,000 ETH, half as a donation and half as a loan to Aave (The Block). Arbitrum DAO voters approved releasing the frozen ETH to DeFi United, but a 1 May court order, filed by plaintiffs holding terrorism judgments against North Korea who sought the ETH, restricted the DAO from moving it (The Block). Kelp reopened rsETH withdrawals on 14 May and, by 26 May, said rsETH had been restored after sending a final 20,373.7 rsETH to the LayerZero contract (Cointelegraph).

Account reviewed 22 November 2026. The facts in it come from the sources linked in the text; the figures above are DefiLlama's record, which places it on Ethereum, Arbitrum and files the target as DeFi Protocol.

In DefiLlama's record

Kelp, as the record lists it. Newest first. Source: DefiLlama.
DateIncidentClass TechniqueChainsAmount
2026-04-18 Kelp Bridge & Cross-Chain Cross-Chain Message Spoofing Ethereum, Arbitrum $293.0M

More from the record: every incident in 2026, Bridge & Cross-Chain, and the whole record.

Other large incidents in 2026

Incidents in 2026 with a page of their own. Largest first. Source: DefiLlama.
DateIncidentClass TechniqueChainsAmount
2026-10-29 Binance CEX Frontend & Infrastructure Key Leaked via Infrastructure Ethereum, Bitcoin, Tron, Avalanche, Optimism, Arbitrum, Base $6.4B
2026-09-24 Bitget Key Compromise Hot Wallet Key Compromised Ethereum, XRPL, Tron, Zcash $387.0M
2026-09-06 Liquid Network Bridge & Cross-Chain Unbacked Cross-Chain Mint Liquid $320.0M
2026-04-01 Drift Trade Access Control Proxy Upgrade Hijack Solana $295.0M
2026-08-30 Tectonic Token & Share Accounting Donation Attack Cronos $124.5M
2026-07-31 COLDCARD Key Compromise Weak Key Generation Bitcoin $116.0M
2026-10-09 Ledger (Supply Chain) Frontend & Infrastructure Supply Chain Attack — $93.0M

Source: DefiLlama, retrieved 22 November 2026, under its open methodology. Figures are a dated snapshot, not a live feed.