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Wallets

What happens to crypto when its holder dies or cannot act

Crypto held on an exchange passes to heirs much as a bank balance does: slowly, on paper, through a process the company runs. Crypto held in self-custody passes only if someone can find the keys and knows what to do with them, because there is no company to apply to and nothing anyone can reset. The instruments that bridge that gap are a letter that says where things are, shared control through multisig, and spending rules that unlock with time. Each solves a different part of the problem, and none of it is legal advice: succession law differs by country, and the examples here say which jurisdiction they come from.

Two kinds of holding, two kinds of problem

On an exchange, the holder owns a claim against a company, recorded in its database. When the holder dies, that claim is an asset of the estate like any other, and the problem is administrative: proving who has authority to deal with it.

In self-custody there is no claim and no counterparty. There are keys, derived from a phrase, and whoever controls the keys controls the funds. When the holder dies, the problem is informational and technical: does anyone know the wallet exists, can they find the phrase, and can they use it without exposing or destroying it? Exchange or self-custody describes that difference as recourse against control, and inheritance is where it stops being abstract.

Custodial accounts: an estate process

An exchange’s estate process asks for documents, not keys. Kraken’s published deceased client claims page is one example of what such a process involves. It asks for an official death certificate (not one issued by a funeral home), a document confirming the claimant’s appointment as the estate’s legal representative, such as probate or letters of administration, a current photo ID for that person, and a signed, dated letter from them confirming the death. It says further documents may be requested. It also says the exchange does not currently let a holder name a beneficiary on the account, so the balance is dealt with through the estate.

The practical consequence is that an exchange balance is reachable by an executor who knows it exists. Statements, emails and bank records point to it, and the company’s process does the rest, at the pace of any estate administration. The risk on this side is not that the keys are lost but that the company is: an executor dealing with a venue that has stopped withdrawals is a creditor, and what happens when an exchange fails describes that position.

Self-custody: nobody can reset anything

A self-custodial wallet has no account to claim and nobody to send a death certificate to. A hardware device holds its keys behind a PIN, the phrase is wherever the holder put it, and the chain does not know or care that the holder has died. An heir needs four things: to know the wallet exists, to find the phrase or a working device, to know any passphrase that was used with it, and to know how to restore it without making a mistake that cannot be undone.

The first of those is harder than it sounds. HM Revenue and Customs, in the inheritance tax section of its Cryptoassets Manual, notes that it may not always be straightforward to identify whether the deceased held any cryptoassets. Its checklist for personal representatives is a fair picture of the search: exchange accounts, payments to crypto services on bank and card statements, emails mentioning wallets or Bitcoin, wallet apps on the deceased’s phone or computer, and personal papers that might hold recovery phrases. The same manual treats cryptoassets as part of the estate like other assets and asks for their value at the date of death. Other tax authorities have their own rules; this one is cited because it describes the search an executor actually faces.

What QuadrigaCX does and does not show

QuadrigaCX, the Canadian exchange that collapsed after its chief executive’s death, is widely remembered as a case of keys dying with their holder. The Ontario Securities Commission’s staff review, published in June 2020, sets out staff’s account. Quadriga announced on 14 January 2019 that Gerald Cotten had died in India the previous month. By 5 February the platform had stopped operating and filed for creditor protection. Over 76,000 clients were owed a combined C$215 million, the bankruptcy trustee recovered or identified C$46 million, and clients lost at least C$169 million.

The review’s central finding cuts against the usual telling. Staff wrote that it was widely believed the shortfall came from lost or inaccessible private keys, and that this was not the case: most of the losses resulted from fraud by Cotten, including trading against clients with fictitious balances from accounts opened under aliases. The report itself warns that these are staff’s views of the evidence, not findings of fact by an OSC hearing panel, and that they have not been tested before the OSC’s tribunal or a court.

So the case is evidence about a custodian under one person’s unchecked control, not about lost keys. Its relevance to a household is the structure: a single person who alone can move the assets is a single point of failure, whether through death, fraud or incapacity.

A letter that says where, not what

The simplest instrument is written down. In England and Wales, a will becomes a public document once probate is granted, and copies can be ordered through GOV.UK. A seed phrase in a will is therefore a seed phrase in a public document. The usual companion is a letter of wishes, which a solicitor’s guide published in The Gazette describes as not legally binding, easy to update, and confidential to the executors, trustees or family rather than public.

The letter that helps is one that lets an heir find and use the wallet without itself being the key. What such a letter can record:

  • What exists. Which wallets, on which chains, and roughly what each is for, so nothing is missed.
  • Where the backup is. The location of the phrase or shares, not the words themselves.
  • What else is needed. Whether a passphrase was used, where a hardware device is, which software restores it.
  • Whom to ask. Someone technically competent the holder trusted, named in advance.
  • What not to do. Never type the phrase into a website, never accept help from anyone who makes contact first, never guess a device’s PIN.

A letter that sits next to the phrase is no protection at all; one that sits with a solicitor while the phrase sits elsewhere at least means no single place holds both. How the phrase itself should be stored is covered in where to store a seed phrase.

Multisig with a trusted party

Shared control removes the single point of failure without giving anyone the whole key. In a two-of-three multisig wallet, built on Bitcoin’s M-of-N transaction form, any two of three independent keys can spend and no one key can. A holder might keep two of the keys, stored apart, and give the third to a trusted party. While the holder lives, they can spend alone and can survive losing one key. After death, an heir told where one of the holder’s keys is can move the funds only together with the trusted party, and the trusted party can do nothing alone.

The costs are real. Each key needs its own backup, the wallet’s configuration (every public key and the threshold) has to be recorded so the wallet can be rebuilt, and the heir has to be able to operate a setup that is more complex than a single wallet. Multisig wallets explained goes through how that works.

Time locks: a key that only works later

Bitcoin’s script can make an output unspendable until a point in the future. BIP-65, which introduced OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY, opens its motivating examples with something close to the inheritance scenario. Two business partners hold funds in a two-of-two arrangement and appoint a lawyer as a backstop in case either is “hit by a bus”, without wanting the lawyer able to collude with either of them in the meantime. The script lets the partners spend at any time, and lets the lawyer and one partner spend only after a set date.

Applied to one holder, the same shape gives two spending paths: the holder’s own key at any time, and an heir’s key only after a date or block height. BIP-112, OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY, adds the relative version, restricting a path based on the age of the output being spent. With a relative lock the heir’s path opens only after the coins have sat untouched for a set period, and the holder keeps it closed by periodically moving them to a fresh output. Either way the network enforces the rule, not a person, and the holder has to keep renewing it. A holder who stops renewing because of incapacity rather than death opens the heir’s path just the same.

The older approach, a transaction signed in advance with its lock-time field set to a future date, works as a revocable instruction: it cannot be mined before that time, and the holder cancels it by spending the coins first. BIP-65 notes the limit of that approach: a pre-signed transaction proves the output can be spent in the future but cannot prove it will not be spent some other way first.

These are Bitcoin mechanisms. On Ethereum, an ordinary account is controlled by whoever holds its private key; rules of this kind have to be enforced by contract code, which moves the trust from a person to a piece of software that has to be correct.

What executors run into

Finding it at all. The HMRC checklist above is the realistic starting point, and it depends on the holder having left traces.

Devices that defend themselves. Hardware wallets wipe after repeated wrong PINs. Ledger says its devices factory-reset after three incorrect attempts; Trezor’s devices erase the wallet after 16, or 10 on the Safe 7. Guessing is destructive, and without the phrase a wiped device is the end of the matter.

A phrase that opens an empty wallet. If the holder used a passphrase, the phrase alone restores a different, empty wallet with no error, as what a seed phrase passphrase does explains. A derivation path or chain mismatch looks the same; what to do about a lost seed phrase lists the usual causes.

Restoring safely. Once an executor restores a phrase into software, the funds are exposed in the same way the holder’s were, on whatever device was used. Until they move to a wallet under the estate’s control, the restore has created one more exposed copy. Offers of help from anyone who makes contact first fit the patterns in crypto recovery scams.

Incapacity is the harder case

Death at least starts a process. Incapacity does not: there is no death certificate, the holder may recover, and for a custodial account, what the company will accept from someone acting for a living holder is set by its terms and local law, which are worth reading while they are hypothetical. For self-custody the instruments above work the same way, with one difference worth planning around. A letter, a co-signer or a time lock that only operates on death does nothing for a holder who is alive and unable to act; the arrangements that cover both say who may act, and when, in each case.

The test of any plan is short: could someone who is not you, holding only what you left them, find the funds and move them without exposing them? How crypto wallets actually fail ends its section on long-term storage on the same point, and it is the one failure that a holder can only prevent by telling someone.